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Abstract: Drawing on the theory of relational governance, this study determines the 12 
nexus of inter-organizational trust, principled negotiation, and joint action in cost 13 
performance. To this end, it formulates five hypotheses based on established 14 
management theories or principles of organizational studies. The study uses partial least 15 
squares structural equation modeling to analyze the 248 valid questionnaires collected 16 
from the analyzed organizations involved in megaprojects. The results show that inter-17 
organizational trust has a direct and indirect positive effect on improving cost 18 
performance. Principled negotiation and joint action can serve as multiple mediating 19 
roles between inter-organizational trust and cost performance. Contractual governance 20 
also has different moderation effects on principled negotiation and joint action toward 21 
cost performance. In conclusion, this study contributes to the knowledge on inter-22 
organizational trust and its mediating effects on cost performance from the perspective 23 
of megaprojects. The results are generalizable to other projects with complicated 24 
organizational and working relationships. 25 
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Introduction 28 
Poor cost performance remains a pervasive issue in megaprojects (Shahtaheri et al. 29 
2017). The contracting parties should share project risks equally through their either 30 
working or contractual relationships (Chong et al. 2016). Owing to the different types 31 
of project delivery systems, effective negotiation is vital in maintaining these 32 
relationships during the contract formation stage and contract lifecycle. The mutual 33 
benefits of inter-organizational trust would thus create an efficient and harmonious 34 
working environment, resulting in improved project performance (Pinto et al. 2009). 35 
However, conflicting relationships could drive self-centered behavior and opportunism 36 
(Anderson and Polkinghorn 2008).  37 
Generally, addressing cost performance issues revolves around project planning and 38 
scheduling (Flyvbjerg et al. 2004; Doloi 2011), contracts and tendering (Lee and Hwang 39 
2007), cost management and prediction (Love et al. 2017), and project team 40 
management (Scott-Young and Samson 2008). Previous studies often adopt a 41 
deterministic approach in identifying the various causes of cost overrun in megaprojects 42 
(Olaniran et al. 2015; Siemiatycki 2018) and give only generic suggestions for 43 
mitigating and containing such issues (Olawale and Sun 2010; Kim et al. 2017). Some 44 
studies also investigate the impact of inter-organizational trust on project performance 45 
through relationship optimization (Stevens et al. 2015) and risk allocation in the 46 
contract (Sumo et al. 2016). Other studies highlight the importance of negotiations in 47 
improving inter-organizational trust (Koeszegi 2004) and project performance 48 
(Kalkman and Waard 2017). However, the detailed interactions between the multiple 49 
determinants of cost performance have yet to be attempted either in project management 50 
or megaprojects, particularly through an integrative analysis of inter-organizational 51 
trust, using the appropriate negotiation method and the resulting joint action for 52 
improved cost performance. Furthermore, the increasing need for megaprojects is 53 
obvious due to economic and urban growth (Jaffee 2015), including the academic 54 
preoccupation with organizational complexity (Qureshi and Kang 2015). 55 
This study draws on the theory of relational governance, which can prevent other 56 
stakeholders’ opportunistic behaviors similarly to contractual governance (Williamson 57 
2002). Regarding the complexity of megaprojects, contractors often take the averages 58 
of changes and price adjustments to maximize their profits, which would increase 59 
project cost (Lumineau and Henderson 2012). In this context, relational governance 60 
could enable stakeholders to establish trust as to perform collective actions (Das and 61 
Kumar 2010), where negotiation and collaboration are the main two process strategies 62 
(Krapfel et al. 1991). This study thus adopts principled negotiation as negotiation 63 
approach, owing to its established and structured approach (Carneiro et al. 2013). The 64 
study also considers joint action resulting from inter-organizational trust and/or 65 
principled negotiation. Further, this study focuses on megaprojects, as these projects 66 
are bound to suffer cost overruns or cost performance issues (Flyvbjerg 2014). A 67 
simplified approach is used to determine the scale of megaprojects, targeting large 68 
projects in China, of approximately RMB 1 billion, to appreciate the complexities of 69 
the project and organizational relationships in terms of cost performance issues. 70 
Consequently, the study employed the questionnaire survey approach to collect data 71 
from the organizations involved in megaprojects. The data were then analyzed using 72 
partial least squares structural equation modeling. Section 2 provides the theoretical 73 
background of inter-organizational trust, principled negotiation, and joint action. 74 
Section 3 discusses the research hypotheses and model. Section 4 describes the research 75 
setting, including sampling, data collection procedures, measures, and instruments. 76 
Section 5 presents the results and analysis. Section 6 discusses the findings and 77 
contributions. Section 7 concludes the research.  78 
Theoretical Background 79 
Literature on megaprojects is limited, especially on inter-organizational trust, 80 
principled negotiation, and joint action. Hence, the following review and theoretical 81 
foundation mainly refer to established management theories or principles of 82 
organizational studies. 83 
Trust-based relational governance 84 
A non-repetitive transaction between contracting parties can easily establish a 85 
relationship based on “opportunism” in construction projects. Project owners tend to 86 
impose risks on contractors through contract clauses, while contractors make full use 87 
of the “loopholes” in the clauses to make up for their losses (e.g., unbalanced quotations, 88 
changes, price adjustment, claims). This opportunistic behavior affects project 89 
performance, owing to poor coordination of relational and contractual governance 90 
(Lumineau and Henderson 2012). 91 
Conventional practices in construction mainly rely on contractual governance, which 92 
defines roles, responsibilities, processes, rewards, and punishments through explicit 93 
provisions to prevent opportunistic inter-subjectivity and achieve predetermined project 94 
objectives (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Reuer and Ariño 2007). However, owing to 95 
contract rigidity, incomplete information, and project complexity, contracting parties 96 
may adopt adverse behaviors to maximize their interests, such as making inappropriate 97 
changes that increase project cost (Cheung and Yiu 2006). Such working environments 98 
require relational governance to mediate behaviors and relationships (Lu et al. 2015). 99 
As a result, the proper use of relational governance could provide benefits similar to 100 
those of contract governance in controlling opportunism and facilitating adaption 101 
(Heide and John 1992). However, there is no unanimous conclusion on the role of 102 
contractual and relational governance on project performance, in terms of 103 
complementarity or substitution. They not only prevent behavioral uncertainties, but 104 
also enable stakeholders to establish trust and understanding to perform collective 105 
action (Das and Kumar 2010). However, the substitution perspective builds around the 106 
notion that formal rules can initiate an escalating spiral of formality and distance, 107 
thereby undermining the operation of social norms underlying informal dealings 108 
(Larson 1992). 109 
Megaprojects are particularly suitable for relational governance, owing to their 110 
complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, and long time-scales, which induces collaborative 111 
work among stakeholders and promotes project performance (Gil et al. 2011). The 112 
relational governance mechanism shows increased more, participation, and solidarity 113 
(Lumineau and Henderson 2012). Particularly, solidarity refers to stakeholders who 114 
consider mutual benefits in the project implementation process, engage in bilateral 115 
problem solving, and commit to joint and coordinated action toward shared objectives.  116 
Implementing relational governance involves mutual adaption and adjustment by all 117 
project stakeholders, based on inter-organizational trust (Yu et al. 2006; Shahtaheri et 118 
al. 2017). Here, trust is “a disposition or attitude concerning the willingness to rely upon 119 
the actions of another party, under circumstances of contractual and social obligations, 120 
with the potential for collaboration” (Edkins and Smyth 2006). Inter-organizational 121 
trust can thus promote and strengthen information sharing, flexibility, solidarity, and 122 
cooperation between organizations (Kim 2000; Poppo and Zenger 2002). Therefore, it 123 
is not only the basis of relational governance, but also a function of adopted relational 124 
governance to improve project performance (Gil et al. 2011). 125 
Negotiation and joint action as the process of relational governance 126 
Interest commonality and power balance are two important aspects of implementing 127 
relational governance. Interest commonality is the basis for maintaining organizational 128 
relations, while the balance of power is key to the relationship between project 129 
organizations (Thorelli 1986). Referring to these two dimensions, Krapfel et al. (1991) 130 
proposed six strategies for relational governance, based on resolution of conflicts, 131 
degree of information sharing, and coordination and decision-making, which, as Fig. 1 132 
shows, have been adapted to the construction industry. 133 
Insert Fig. 1 here 134 
In construction projects or megaprojects, formal contracts link various stakeholders 135 
and each stakeholder is an independent legal entity. They may perceive and hope for a 136 
balance of power in the project through negotiation and collaboration (joint action), 137 
which are the mediating roles of rational governance, as per the Krapfel et al.’s (1991) 138 
model.  139 
Hence, on the one hand, negotiation is an important means of establishing an 140 
effective working relationship between stakeholders, which can reduce cognitive and 141 
operational differences in project scope, cost, schedule, and quality (Love et al. 2017). 142 
Negotiations can then be divided into distributive and integrative bargaining, based on 143 
differences in the opposition and unity of interests between negotiators. Distributive 144 
bargaining can resolve disputes where parties have opposing interests (Tremblay 2016). 145 
Project stakeholders bargain to maximize their interests, which is not conducive to the 146 
realization of project objectives and worsens trust and working relationships between 147 
parties. On the other hand, integrative bargaining induces a cooperative negotiation 148 
approach in which the interests of parties are common or complementary. Principled 149 
negotiation is an established and well-known method of integrative bargaining 150 
developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury in the 1980s through the Harvard 151 
Negotiation Project (Fisher et al. 2011). This method emphasizes win-win solutions, 152 
while protecting participants who might take advantage of their bargaining power. It 153 
contains four basic points, each of which addresses a basic element of negotiation and 154 
suggests an action: (a) separate the people from the problem; (b) focus on interests, not 155 
positions; (c) generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do; and (d) insist 156 
that the result be based on some objective standard. However, mutual trust is the most 157 
basic condition, and its lack will soon return the negotiation to distributive bargaining 158 
(Tremblay 2016).  159 
On the other hand, joint action is another strategy for relational governance among 160 
project organizations. It is a form of inter-organizational cooperation, which includes a 161 
set of conditions to determine the exchanges of members in the decision-making 162 
process（Heide and John 1990). Meanwhile, it also serves as the procedural dimension 163 
of relational governance (Zaheer and Venkatraman 2010). Joint action among project 164 
stakeholders means different stakeholders can share information and jointly formulate 165 
the project implementation plan. This enables stakeholders to address various types of 166 
uncertainties during the implementation process more effectively. In numerous cases, 167 
joint action derives from the outcomes of negotiations during a project’s life. Therefore, 168 
joint action among project stakeholders improves cost performance.  169 
Hypotheses Development 170 
Relationship between inter-organizational trust and cost performance 171 
The measurement of cost performance does not include control over the cost estimate 172 
but includes cost overruns due to uncertainties (Thomas et al. 2002). As such, project 173 
cost performance has a close relationship with cooperation between contracting parties, 174 
which becomes vulnerable without trust (Cheung et al. 2013). Additionally, inter-175 
organizational trust takes different forms, such as calculus-based, relational-based, and 176 
institutional trust (Rousseau et al. 1998). Inter-organizational trust can lower the risks 177 
taken by contracting parties, facilitate negotiation, and reduce transaction costs (Diallo 178 
and Thuillier 2005). Therefore, inter-organizational trust directly influences the actions 179 
and performance of organizations engaged in dyadic and network relationships (Zaheer 180 
and Harris 2008), which run through the entire project management process, namely 181 
planning, designing, scope changing, resource allocating, organizing, and controlling 182 
(Doloi 2011; Cheung et al. 2013). Wong and Cheung (2005) state that competence, 183 
problem solving, communication, openness, alignment, information flow, reputation, 184 
alternative techniques of dispute resolution, and satisfactory terms are essential trust 185 
attributes in projects. Trust-based relationships create advantages in conducting 186 
business, such as lowering cost and improving performance (Doloi 2009). 187 
Consequently, inter-organizational trust enables cooperative behavior, promotes 188 
adaptive organizational forms, reduces damaging conflicts, and transaction costs. 189 
Therefore, inter-organizational trust is posited to contribute significantly to cost 190 
performance as per the following hypothesis: 191 
H1: Inter-organizational trust is positively and directly related to cost performance. 192 
Mediation effect of principled negotiation  193 
Establishing a relationship of mutual trust is crucial in any negotiation, as it can 194 
change the “resistance” mentality of individuals, particularly in the construction 195 
industry. Subsequently, it can initiate negotiations, reduce difficulties during the 196 
negotiation process, and increase the chances of success. Trust is one of the 197 
deterministic factors in reducing negotiation costs and conflict levels (Fiala et al. 2013). 198 
High inter-organizational trust translates into similar underlying assumptions in 199 
negotiating positions and faster agreements (Zaheer et al. 1998). 200 
Moreover, organizations can adopt principled negotiation for all types of 201 
disagreements to maintain a harmonious relationship throughout the process and avoid 202 
adverse impacts on the project (Cheung et al. 2009). It also decreases monitoring cost 203 
and increases the possibility of achieving mutually beneficial agreements (Khalfan et 204 
al. 2007). Therefore, inter-organizational trust between project organizations would 205 
directly promote negotiation efficiency and project performance (Zuppa 2009). 206 
Consequently, the following hypothesis is proposed: 207 
H2: Principled negotiation mediates the relationship between inter-organizational 208 
trust and cost performance. 209 
Mediation effect of joint action  210 
Joint action indicates closer relationships, which involve the parties performing 211 
cooperative and coordinated focal activities (Heide and John 1990). Joint action is also 212 
part of a governance process comprising joint planning and problem solving. Inter-213 
organizational trust is an important antecedent of joint action that will positively 214 
influence any activities of joint planning or problem solving (Claro et al. 2003). Inter-215 
organizational trust can thus facilitate the process of cooperation and maintain stable 216 
partnerships (Chua et al. 2008). Consequently, inter-organizational trust can promote 217 
positive expectations from project stakeholders, help reduce opportunism, and promote 218 
joint action for improved cost performance. 219 
Furthermore, joint planning reduces the risk of unexpected problems, which in turn 220 
reduce the need for a sophisticated monitoring apparatus, while joint problem solving 221 
enables creative resolutions to disagreements and other contingencies. Therefore, joint 222 
action can increase feedback and circulation among processes before and after the 223 
project, reduce the feedback path during the project life cycle, and reduce costs through 224 
comprehensive communication and interaction between project stakeholders. 225 
Substantial evidence demonstrates that close cooperation among subjects in a project 226 
can improve project cost performance (Claro et al. 2003). Therefore, the following 227 
hypothesis is proposed: 228 
H3: Joint action mediates the relationship between inter-organizational trust and 229 
cost performance. 230 
Multiple mediation effect of principled negotiation and joint action 231 
Principled negotiation and joint action are important parts of relational governance. 232 
The objective of principled negotiation is to work with the opponent to explore potential 233 
solutions for fair and equitable settlement and maintain a harmonious relationship 234 
between parties (Ren et al. 2011). When implementing principled negotiation, parties 235 
share information, communicate clearly, maintain a cooperative attitude, and focus on 236 
developing common interests, all of which promote cooperation between organizations 237 
(Soliman and Antheaume 2017). Macritchie et al. (2017) proposed that successful joint 238 
action requires negotiation, especially in the event of goal incongruence. Overall, 239 
principled negotiation is an interest-based cooperative negotiation, which can resolve 240 
low consensus or disagreements among stakeholders in the temporary working 241 
environment of projects. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 242 
H4: Principled negotiation and joint action play multiple mediating roles between 243 
inter-organizational trust and cost performance. 244 
Moderation effect of contractual governance  245 
The nature of a contract is likely to influence existing relational norms between 246 
parties. Contract governance deals with the problem of creating and monitoring rules 247 
that ensure a partner performs in accordance with one’s desires or expectations (Salbu 248 
2010). Under strict contract control scenarios, both parties would spend most efforts on 249 
their respective tasks and carry out rewards and punishments in accordance with the 250 
terms of the contract, which hinders them from spending time and resources in joint 251 
action (Lumineau and Henderson 2012). Specifically, if the project were under very 252 
high levels of environmental uncertainties, formal contracting and relational 253 
governance would weaken (Abdi and Aulakh 2014). Therefore, it seems difficult to 254 
align joint action with contractual governance, as all contractual obligations and 255 
expectations are fixed at the start of the project (Ghoshal and Moran 1996). 256 
However, principled negotiation is more applicable at the time of stipulated events 257 
in the contract. Therefore, the provisions of the control clause in the contract often lack 258 
a moderating role. Meanwhile, principled negotiation resolves disputes and chooses 259 
solutions based on objective criteria to which everyone agrees (Tremblay 2016), which 260 
ensures contract control will not have a significant impact on the project. Therefore, the 261 
following hypothesis is proposed: 262 
H5a: Contractual governance dose not moderate the positive influence of principled 263 
negotiation on cost performance. 264 
H5b: Contractual governance moderates the positive influence of joint action on cost 265 
performance. 266 
Method 267 
Sample and procedures 268 
Questionnaire data were obtained from the owners and contractors of large and 269 
complex construction projects in the areas surrounding Jiangsu province, China. The 270 
questionnaire was administered to 80 organizations, requesting the respondents to 271 
answer based on their participation in projects. Mega construction projects of 272 
approximately RMB 1 billion were targeted and 350 questionnaires sent to project 273 
stakeholders or involved organizations in early April 2016, receiving 296 responses by 274 
the end of May 2016. The response rate was 84.6%. The high response rate was due to 275 
the support and cooperation of local authorities, who helped in distributing and 276 
collecting the questionnaires. After removing all incomplete responses, 248 valid 277 
questionnaires from 69 owners, 148 contractors, and 31 others (including external 278 
designers and consultants) were obtained, representing 27.8%, 59.7%, and 12.5%, 279 
respectively.  280 
Most megaprojects were transport infrastructure ones (67.8%) and others were large 281 
and mixed development of industrial and commercial buildings (7.6%), residential 282 
buildings (3.6%), and public buildings (15.3%). The duration of most projects was 3–5 283 
years (72.2%) and most had very large contract amounts, such as RMB 5–10 billion 284 
(34.7%) and above RMB 10 billion (18.1%). Most respondents (86.7%) are 285 
construction professionals (registered designers and engineers) with over five years of 286 
work experience. Table 1 shows the details of survey participants and projects. 287 
Insert Table 1 here 288 
Measure 289 
This study adopts the questionnaire survey method, and each questionnaire item is 290 
rated using a five-point Likert scale (i.e., 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). 291 
Before issuing the questionnaires, two specialists with experience of more than 15 years 292 
in megaprojects were invited to examine the questionnaire content. They agreed that 293 
cost performance includes budget and overruns, as well as litigation or claims-related 294 
costs, to ensure the questionnaire is realistic. 295 
(1) Inter-organizational trust 296 
Inter-organizational trust was divided into calculus- and relational-based trust. The 297 
scale developed by Rousseau et al. (1998) to measure inter-organizational trust using 298 
seven items was adopted here. 299 
 (2) Principled negotiation 300 
The four philosophies of principled negotiation were considered in designing the 301 
questions (Fisher et al. 2011). The questions examine the importance of using principled 302 
negotiation to achieve better cost performance from the perspective of inter-303 
organizational trust.  304 
(3) Joint action 305 
The construct of joint action reflects the degree of interpenetration of organizational 306 
boundaries and the extent of cooperation and coordination in exchange activities 307 
(Zaheer and Harris 2008). Notably, joint action should include joint problem solving 308 
and planning (Wang 2011).  309 
(4) Cost performance 310 
Four variables were developed to gauge the construction project cost performance by 311 
measuring related estimated budgets, overruns, litigation, or claims (Chan and Chan 312 
2004). 313 
(5) Contractual governance 314 
Contractual governance defines roles and responsibilities, the performance of which 315 
is necessary, especially for monitoring penalties and noncompliance. More importantly, 316 
it also determines outcomes or outputs (Wong and Cheung 2005).  317 
Table 2 shows all the variables or questions in the questionnaire. 318 
Insert Table 2 here 319 
Data analytical procedures 320 
SmartPLS 3.0 is a common software that utilizes the PLS approach to estimate both 321 
theoretical models and hypothesized relationships (Ringle et al. 2015). The PLS 322 
approach is considered to be a more effective modeling method with fewer stringent 323 
requirements (including multivariate normality, measurement levels of manifest 324 
variables, large samples) than co-variance based SEM (Bernroider et al. 2014). 325 
Following Hair et al. (2014), a two-stage analytical procedure was used. In the first 326 
stage, the measurement model (also known as the outer model in PLS) was assessed to 327 
confirm its validity and reliability. In the second stage, the structural model (also known 328 
as the inner model in PLS) was tested to confirm direct and indirect interaction 329 
relationships in the hypothesized model. 330 
Results 331 
Common method bias 332 
There is a possibility of potential bias with all self-reported data resulting from 333 
multiple sources, such as consistency motif and social desirability. Podsakoff et al. 334 
(2003) noted there are both procedural and statistical remedies in controlling for the 335 
bias. The procedural methods used in this questionnaire were rigorously reviewed by 336 
peers, both pre- and pilot testing. These methods improved the study and provided more 337 
consistent and unbiased scales. As per the statistic method proposed by Liang et al. 338 
(2007), all constructs were reflectively associated with the method factor and variance 339 
could be explained by the construct and the method factor (bias). As shown in Table 3, 340 
the average substantive explained variance is 0.69 and the average common method-341 
based variance 0.02. This shows substantive variance to method variance is 34.5:1. 342 
Additionally, the structural model shows different levels of significance for path 343 
coefficients. Most method factor loadings are not significant. Given the small 344 
magnitude and insignificance of method variance, the method is unlikely to be a serious 345 
concern in this study. 346 
Insert Table 3 here 347 
Measurement model 348 
According to PLS researchers (Hair et al. 2014; Palanski et al. 2011; Ringle et al. 349 
2015), the measurement model test includes two primary parts: (a) convergent validity 350 
and (b) discriminant validity. Convergent validity examines whether indicators are 351 
sharing a high proportion of variance and convergence within the same concept, while 352 
discriminant validity different constructs and indicators to confirm whether they are 353 
distinct and unique (Hulland 2015).  354 
Convergent validity 355 
The test for convergent validity usually assesses individual item reliability, internal 356 
consistency reliability, and average variance extracted (AVE). These tests were 357 
conducted by performing the PLS algorithm, as implemented in SmartPLS. 358 
First, individual item reliability was assessed by examining outer loadings, as the 359 
accepted items should have more explanatory power than error variance (Fornell and 360 
Larcker 1981). Generally, the accepted cutoff for item loadings is 0.70 or greater 361 
(Palanski et al. 2011). As Table 1 shows, all factor loadings are equal to or greater than 362 
the recommended cutoff value. Therefore, individual item reliability is significantly 363 
robust. 364 
Second, unlike individual item reliability reflecting convergent validity at the 365 
indicator level, AVEs were used to assess the convergent validity of measurement 366 
models at construct level. Huang and Jiang (2012) suggest that the threshold value of 367 
AVE should be 0.5. All AVEs for each construct are greater than 0.5, which indicates 368 
good convergent validity. 369 
Finally, both Cronbach's alpha and composite reliability were used to assess internal 370 
construct consistency. Cronbach's alpha should be at least 0.70 (Fornell and Larcker 371 
1981), while the accepted range of composite reliability should be between 0.60 and 372 
0.95 (Hair et al. 2014). All constructs in the study meet these criteria. 373 
By simultaneously analyzing the main items, the results show the measurement 374 
model has adequate convergent validity, such as Trust (AVE = 0.667, CR = 0.936, α = 375 
0.96), Principled negotiation (AVE = 0.669, CR = 0.89, α = 0.837), Joint action (AVE 376 
= 0.702, CR = 0.904, α = 0.859), Cost performance (AVE = 0.65, CR = 0.881, α = 377 
0.822), and Formal contract (AVE = 0.679, CR = 0.914, α = 0.882). 378 
Discriminant validity 379 
Following Chin (2010) and Huang and Jiang (2012), the Fornell-Larcker mode of 380 
analysis was used to examine discriminant validity. Hence, the square root of the AVE 381 
of a construct should be greater than all the correlation levels between that construct 382 
and the other constructs in the model (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Table 2 (square roots 383 
of AVEs between parentheses along the diagonal axis) shows the square root of the AVE 384 
for each construct is greater than its respective correlation value, indicating the 385 
constructs in this study exhibit good discriminant validity (Bock et al. 2005). The 386 
heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) ratio of correlations test was also performed, following 387 
Henseler et al. (2015). Table 4 shows all values of the HTMT ratio are below 0.9, thus 388 
passing the discriminant validity assessment between latent variables. 389 
Insert Table 4 here 390 
Predictive relevance 391 
Stone–Geisser’s Q-square test validates the predictive relevance of the research 392 
model (Geisser 1974; Stone 1974). The blindfolding procedure was implemented in 393 
SmartPLS to generate the Q-square results. There are two types of Q-square: cross-394 
validated redundancy and communality. Generally, cross-validated redundancy can be 395 
validated through prediction. Table 5 shows all cross-validated redundancy values are 396 
above 0, indicating the research model has well predictive relevance. 397 
Insert Table 5 here 398 
R square 399 
The R square (R2) value predicts the amount of variance in the outcome variable that 400 
can be explained by all predictor variables linked to it. As shown in Table 6, the R2 401 
values range between 0 and 1, with higher values representing higher levels of 402 
predictive accuracy (Ringle et al. 2015). Chin (1998) divided the measured coefficient 403 
value in the PLS model into high (0.67), medium (0.33), and low (0.19). If an 404 
endogenous latent variable in the structural model is explained only by few (one or two) 405 
exogenous latent variables, a medium degree of measurement coefficient is acceptable. 406 
Otherwise, if the endogenous latent variable is explained by an increased number of 407 
variables (at least three), coefficients are only acceptable at a higher level. Table 5 408 
shows that all R2 values are above 0.33, which indicates the prediction variable is 409 
effective. 410 
Insert Table 6 here 411 
Structural model 412 
The PLS algorithm and bootstrapping are used to evaluate the structural model. 413 
Standardized path coefficient β is obtained from the PLS algorithm, while the statistical 414 
significance of each path is determined by the t-value for a given bivariate relationship 415 
based on a bootstrapping function with 5,000 iterations (Palanski et al. 2011). 416 
Specifically, the critical t-values are 1.96, 2.58, and 3.29, respectively representing p < 417 
0.05, p < 0.01, and p < 0.001,. 418 
Insert Fig. 2 here 419 
As shown in Fig. 2 and Table 7, inter-organizational trust is significantly and 420 
positively related to cost performance (β = 0.552, p < 0.001). Therefore, H1 is 421 
supported. 422 
Insert Table 7 here 423 
To test the mediation hypotheses, an analysis procedure based on the direct and 424 
indirect effects was adopted (Zhao et al. 2010). Meanwhile, this study adopted the 425 
bootstrap test of the indirect effect, which is usually more powerful than the Sobel test 426 
(Preacher and Hayes 2004). Hence, as shown in Table 8, Product Confidence Limits for 427 
Indirect effects (PRODCLIN) was used to measure the confidence interval of specific 428 
indirect mediating effects (Mackinnon et al. 2007). First, direct effects of inter-429 
organizational trust on principled negotiation (β = 0.701, p < 0.001), inter-430 
organizational trust on joint action (β = 0.435, p < 0.001), principled negotiation on 431 
joint action (β = 0.382, p < 0.001), principled negotiation on cost performance (β = 432 
0.241, p < 0.01), and joint action (β = 0.185, p < 0.05) on cost performance are, 433 
respectively, significant. Second, the statistical significance of indirect effects was 434 
determined through 5,000 bootstrap iterations. Estimates were taken within a 95% 435 
confidence interval. As Table 7 shows, the total indirect effect (difference between total 436 
and direct effects/c-c’) of inter-organizational trust on cost performance is statistically 437 
significant (point estimate = 0.299 and 95% BCa CI [0.165, 0.430]). The mediation test 438 
of principled negotiation on the relationship between inter-organizational trust and cost 439 
performance shows the point estimate is significant (point estimate = 0.169 and 95% 440 
BCa CI [0.044, 0.325]). As such, H2 is supported. Similarly, joint action seems to play 441 
a mediation role between inter-organizational trust and cost performance (point 442 
estimate = 0.08 and 95% BCa CI [0.008, 0.186]). Therefore, H3 is supported. Finally, 443 
the multiple-serial mediation of principled negotiation (point estimate = 0.268 and 95% 444 
BCa CI [0.151, 0.412]) and joint action (point estimate = 0.071 and 95% BCa CI [0.008, 445 
0.156]) are statistically significant, which shows principled negotiation and joint action 446 
play multiple mediation roles between inter-organizational trust and cost performance. 447 
Therefore, H4 is supported. 448 
Insert Fig. 3 here 449 
Insert Table 8 here 450 
Moreover, as Table 7 shows, the moderating effect of contractual governance on the 451 
relationship between joint action and cost performance is negatively significant (β = -452 
0.124, p < 0.05). Consequently, H5a is supported. As Fig. 3 shows, when the intensity 453 
of contractual governance is lower, joint action will more significantly affect cost 454 
performance. However, as per Fig. 4, contractual governance does not moderate 455 
principle negotiation on cost performance (β = -0.076, p > 0.05). Therefore, H5b is 456 
supported.  457 
Insert Fig. 4 here 458 
Discussion  459 
Theoretical and practical implications 460 
This study investigates the connection between inter-organizational trust and project 461 
cost performance and explores the multiple mediating effects of principled negotiation 462 
and joint action. The empirical findings show that, as a core element of relational 463 
governance, trust plays a key role in conserving project cost. Furthermore, principle 464 
negotiation and joint action are the two important project tactics in relational 465 
governance, with multiple mediating effects. Simultaneously, contractual governance 466 
has different moderating functions in principle negotiation and joint action. This study 467 
contributes to the literature on the nexus of inter-organizational trust and multiple 468 
mediating effects in improving cost performance from the following aspects. 469 
 The first contribution of this empirical study is in terms of inter-organizational 470 
trust and cost performance. This study focuses on the impact of internal team trust on 471 
project performance (Fung 2014). Although some studies analyze organizational 472 
performance from the perspective of inter-organizational trust, they only treat trust as 473 
an independent construct (Zaheer et al. 1998; Cheung et al. 2013). However, a more 474 
intensive analysis of cost performance is more reasonable for addressing budgetary 475 
control and cost overruns (Thomas et al. 2002). Moreover, trust, negotiation, and 476 
cooperation (joint action) are considered integral parts of relational governance theory, 477 
which extends the existing theoretical boundaries and helps systematically analyze and 478 
determine their impact on project cost performance, as well as their theoretical 479 
relationship with contractual governance. The results show that inter-organizational 480 
trust affects cost performance. Therefore, cost overruns are not only caused by the 481 
technical aspects of the project, such as bidding methods, technical standards, and 482 
resource management, but also by the trust relationship between stakeholders.  483 
The second contribution of this study is referring to the multiple mediating effects 484 
of principled negotiation and joint action between inter-organizational trust and 485 
project performance. This is perhaps the most striking finding, as the study shows that 486 
principle negotiation and joint action have multiple mediating effects and relationships 487 
between inter-organizational trust and project performance. Previous studies on joint 488 
action focused on the relationship between buyers and suppliers, and the interaction 489 
experience in supply chain management (Heide and John 1990; Claro et al. 2003), 490 
mainly to determine cooperation among organizations to strengthen alliances 491 
(Bouncken 2016). This study shows that principled negotiation and joint action perform 492 
mediating roles by upholding the balance of power among stakeholders, further 493 
deconstructing the effect of inter-organizational trust on project cost performance from 494 
the perspective of relational governance. As such, principle negotiation can directly 495 
improve cost performance by solving various types of conflicts in the project (Chen et 496 
al. 2014), and can also enhance cost performance by establishing a fair and cooperative 497 
work scope through principled negotiation and by promoting inter-actor joint action. 498 
On the other hand, joint action can share information, jointly formulate project 499 
implementation plans, and problem-solving strategies to avoid mistakes or 500 
disagreements, improving project cost performance (Larsen et al. 2016). Therefore, 501 
principled negotiation and joint action are mediators. Furthermore, on specific 502 
occasions, organizations can first adopt principled negotiation to resolve conflicts, 503 
followed by joint action to improve project performance. These findings explore the 504 
valuable and insightful internal working principles of relational governance.  505 
Finally, the third contribution lies in the moderating role of contractual 506 
governance. Recently, studies focus on relationships between contractual and relational 507 
governance in various supply chain management situations, such as supplementing, 508 
substitution, or dynamic effects (Abdi and Aulakh 2015; Lumineau and Henderson 509 
2012; Zheng et al. 2008). This study finds contractual governance has different 510 
moderation effects on the impact of principle negotiation and joint action in relational 511 
governance’s strategies on cost performance. The results reveal contractual governance 512 
could negatively affect joint action on cost performance. Joint action will then more 513 
significantly affect cost performance when the intensity of contractual governance is 514 
low. To this end, a contract should emphasize cooperation by strengthening 515 
coordination clauses, reducing the control clause, and increasing flexibility in contract 516 
execution. Consequently, joint action would yield better outcomes from contract 517 
provisions. However, the study also reveals that contractual governance has no 518 
moderation effect on the path of principled negotiation towards cost performance. This 519 
does not mean contractual governance will not affect relational governance. However, 520 
this is because project stakeholders only adopt principled negotiation as an alternative 521 
means from the original contract. 522 
Limitations and future research directions 523 
This study has certain limitations. Owing to the limited literature in this research 524 
area, the theoretical hypotheses refer to generic scenarios in project management. 525 
Although the questionnaire survey targeted megaprojects, the results could vary as per 526 
the ongoing theoretical developments in megaproject management. This area of 527 
research is still evolving in direction and management philosophies (Flyvbjerg 2014). 528 
Moreover, the method is based on horizontal research. The questionnaire data is static 529 
interface data, which only verify the relationship between trust and project cost at the 530 
point of completion of the project, but cannot describe the dynamic process of trust 531 
change accurately. Future studies can thus consider using longitudinal data analysis for 532 
further testing and validation. Furthermore, this study does not break down project 533 
complexity, which can moderate the effect of inter-organizational trust for improving 534 
cost performance in megaprojects. Future research should consider classifying the 535 
details of project complexity in analyzing relational and contractual governance in 536 
megaprojects.  537 
Conclusion 538 
Research on the influence of inter-organizational trust on project cost from the 539 
perspective of relational governance is still in its infancy, and there is much to learn by 540 
examining different variables. As they differ from permanent forms of organization or 541 
project teams, cross-border inter-firm relationships bring new challenges for the 542 
stakeholders and have significant effects on project cost performance. This study 543 
empirically accumulated additional evidence for these effects, indicating principled 544 
negotiation and joint action are important process strategies of relational governance, 545 
which can play mediating roles in inter-organizational trust. Moreover, contractual 546 
governance is the bedrock of a working relationship between stakeholders, moderating 547 
the effect of relational governance on project cost performance. These findings 548 
represent a promising and intriguing step toward a better understanding of improving 549 
project cost performance. Project stakeholders can thus learn to leverage relational and 550 
contractual governance better to improve cost performance. 551 
Although the empirical data were from major infrastructure projects in China, most 552 
projects share generic characteristics, such as moral hazard, cost overruns, and 553 
complicated working relationships. Moreover, the SEM model hypotheses were based 554 
on general theory of relational governance and literature. Consequently, the research 555 
findings are generalizable, and other large and complex projects can refer to them. 556 
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Table 1. Basic Information on Respondents and Projects 
Item Indicators Frequency Percentage (%) 
 Project organization 
 owner 29 11.7 
 contractor 188 75.8 
others 31 12.5 
Gender 
male 217 87.5 
woman 31 12.5 
Age 
under the age of 25 55 22.2 
the age of 26-35 125 50.4 
the age of 36-45 50 20.2 
above the age of 45 18 7.2 
Years of work 
under 3 years 39 15.7 
 3-5 years 97 39.1 
 6-10 years 43 17.4 
above 10 years 69 27.8 
Position 
company director 3 1.2 
 project manager 16 6.5 
department head 55 22.2 
construction 
professional  
174 70.1 
Project category 
traffic infrastructure 168 67.8 
industrial workshop 6 2.4 
trade integrated 13 5.2 
residential district 9 3.6 
public buildings 38 15.3 
others 14 5.7 
Project duration 
under 3 years 24 9.7 
3-5 years 179 72.2 
 4-5 years 39 15.7 
above 5 years 6 2.4 
Project overall 
budget(RMB) 
0.5-1 billion 45 18.2 
1-5 billion 72 29 
5-10 billion 86 34.7 
above 10 billion 45 18.1 
812 
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Table 2. Factor Loadings, AVE, CR, and Cronbach's Alpha of Indicators 
Constructs and measurements 
Outer 
loadings 
AVE CR 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Inter-Organizational Trust   0.677 0.936 0.92 
Item 1: We believe that another party has the ability to achieve 
expected results 
0.917    
Item 2: We believe that another party can meet the technological 
and management requirements of the project  
0.918    
Item 3: We believe that the contract has stipulated the rights, 
responsibilities and obligations of both parties fairly and clearly 
0.893    
Item 4: We believe that another party can be trusted and will 
fulfilled by their promises 
0.903    
Item 5: We believe that another party will abide by the contract in 
the whole project 
0.882    
Item 6: We believe that another party will consider our interests 
when make a major decision 
0.819    
Item 7: We believe that another party will not make use of our 
problems to make profits 
0.83    
 Principled Negotiation  0.671 0.891 0.837 
Item 8: In negotiations, we will use deterministic contract as far as 
possible to share the responsibility objectively  
0.825    
Item 9: In negotiations, we will recognize benefits of both sides 
and invent options for mutual gain 
0.839    
Item 10: We can reach a consensus agreement in terms cost 
sharing, changes, material increases, and so on effectively or 
quickly. 
0.833    
Item 11:  We can reach a consensus agreement in terms cost 
sharing, changes, material increases, and so on easily. 
0.777    
Joint Action   0.702 0.904 0.859 
Item 12: We will promptly provide the information about cost 
structure to another party 
0.817    
Item 13: We will provide information on master plan and schedule 
arrangement to another party 
0.816    
Item 14: We will always be helpful when another party asks for 
help 
0.869    
Item 15: Facing technical difficulties, we will work together with 
another party 
0.849    
Cost Performance  0.651 0.882 0.822 
Item 16: Our project’ cost control is effective and completed 
within the budget  
0.85    
Item 17: Our past projects did not appear significantly cost 
overruns 
0.842    
Item 18: We have no litigation claims against other organizations  0.765    
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Item 19: Compared with other similar projects in the industry, our 
organization’s project cost control is better 
0.768    
Contractual governance  0.679 0.914 0.882 
Item 20: In our projects, we distribute the responsibilities, rights 
and obligations fairly and reasonably 
0.836    
Item 21: In our projects, the contract terms are clear and 
satisfactory 
0.88    
Item 22: In our projects, contract goals are consistent between 
organizations’ needs 
0.808    
Item 23: In our projects, contract has been considered an effective 
means to control the opportunism behavior  
0.771    
Item 24: In our projects, we will regularly check and evaluate the 
behavior and performance between organizations according to the 
contract  
0.822       
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Table 3. Common Method Bias Analysis 814 
Path 
Substantive 
factor 
loading (R1) 
R12 Path 
Method 
factor loading 
(R2) 
R22 
CP -> CP1 0.87*** 
0.7569 
method -> 
cp1 
-0.02 0.0004 
CP -> CP2 0.911*** 
0.829921 
method -> 
cp2 
-0.074 0.005476 
CP -> CP3 0.879*** 
0.772641 
method -> 
cp3 
-0.136 0.018496 
CP -> CP4 0.556*** 
0.309136 
method -> 
cp4 
0.245** 0.060025 
FC -> FC1 0.742*** 
0.550564 
method -> 
fc1 
0.096 0.009216 
FC -> FC2 0.746*** 
0.556516 
method -> 
fc2 
0.141 0.019881 
FC -> FC3 0.735*** 
0.540225 
method -> 
fc3 
0.081 0.006561 
FC -> FC4 0.983*** 
0.966289 
method -> 
fc4 
-0.228 0.051984 
FC -> FC5 0.932*** 
0.868624 
method -> 
fc5 
-0.112 0.012544 
JA -> JA1 0.971*** 
0.942841 
method -> 
ja1 
-0.171**  0.029241 
JA -> JA2 0.823*** 
0.677329 
method -> 
ja2 
-0.003 0.000009 
JA -> JA3 0.82*** 
0.6724 
method -> 
ja3 
0.052 0.002704 
JA -> JA4 0.747*** 
0.558009 
method -> 
ja4 
0.113 0.012769 
PN -> PN1 0.562*** 
0.315844 
method -> 
pn1 
0.291** 0.084681 
PN -> PN2 0.761*** 
0.579121 
method -> 
pn2 
0.082 0.006724 
PN -> PN3 1.007*** 
1.014049 
method -> 
pn3 
-0.192** 0.036864 
PN -> PN4 0.966*** 
0.933156 
method -> 
pn4 
-0.203** 0.041209 
TR -> CT1 0.891*** 
0.793881 
method -> 
ct1 
-0.044 0.001936 
TR -> CT2 0.913*** 
0.833569 
method -> 
ct2 
-0.094 0.008836 
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TR -> CT3 0.646*** 
0.417316 
method -> 
ct3 
0.2 0.04 
TR ->TR1 0.832*** 
0.692224 
method -> 
rt1 
0.04 0.0016 
TR ->TR2  0.857*** 
0.734449 
method -> 
rt2 
-0.02 0.0004 
TR -> TR3 0.953*** 
0.908209 
method -> 
rt3 
-0.172 0.029584 
TR -> TR4 0.669*** 
0.447561 
method -> 
rt4 
0.084 0.007056 
Average 0.823833333 0.69461558   -0.001833333 0.0203415 
Note: PN = principle negotiation; CP = cost performance; FC = contractual 815 
governance; JA = joint action; CT = inter-organizational trust. *, **, and *** indicate 816 
a significance level of p < 0.1, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 817 
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Table 4. Variable Correlations 818 
Variables CP CT FC JA PN RT 
CP 0.807           
CT 0.528 0.909     
FC 0.53 0.773 0.824    
JA 0.56 0.663 0.706 0.838   
PN 0.559 0.638 0.683 0.688 0.819  
RT 0.542 0.743 0.791 0.651 0.669 0.859 
Note: PN = principle negotiation; CP = cost performance; FC = contractual 819 
governance; JA = joint action; CT = calculus-based trust; RT = relational-based trust. 820 
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Table 5. Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) Test Results 821 
Variables CP CT FC JA PN RT 
CP       
CT 0.602      
FC 0.609 0.868     
JA 0.653 0.756 0.805    
PN 0.668 0.723 0.78 0.79   
RT 0.626 0.834 0.894 0.743 0.778   
Note: PN = principle negotiation; CP = cost performance; FC = contractual 822 
governance; JA = joint action; CT = calculus-based trust; RT = relational-based trust. 823 
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Table 6. CV-Redundancy and R Square 824 
Variables CV-Redundancy R Square 
CP 0.237 0.415 
CT 0.662 0.847 
JA 0.371 0.569 
PN 0.306 0.492 
RT 0.62 0.895 
Note: PN = principle negotiation; CP = cost performance; FC = contractual 825 
governance; JA = joint action; CT = calculus-based trust; RT = relational-based trust. 826 
 
827 
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Table 7. Hypotheses Test Results 
Hypothesis Path 
Path 
Coefficient 
(β) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STDEV|) 
P 
Values 
H1 TR -> CP 0.253 0.1 2.522 0.012  
 TR -> PN 0.701 0.047 15.017 0.000  
 TR -> JA 0.435 0.084 5.177 0.000  
 PN -> JA 0.382 0.075 5.075 0.000  
 PN -> CP 0.241 0.092 2.616 0.009  
 JA -> CP 0.185 0.082 2.242 0.025  
H5a 
Moderating 
Effect 1 -> 
CP 
-0.124 0.054 2.283 0.022  
H5b 
Moderating 
Effect 2 -> 
CP 
-0.076 0.045 1.663 0.096 
Note: PN = principle negotiation; CP = cost performance; JA = joint action; TR = 828 
inter-organizational trust.  829 
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Table 8. Summary of Mediating Effect Tests 830 
Hypothesis Effects 
Product of coefficients 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Point estimate 
t 
value 
Lower Upper 
 Total effect  0.552  6.467  0.384  0.724  
 Direct effect 0.253  2.522  0.055  0.448  
 Total indirect 
effect=a1*b1+a2*b2+a1*a3*b2 
0.299  4.423  0.165  0.430  
H2 a1*b1(via PN) 0.169  — 0.044  0.325  
H3 a2*b2(via JA) 0.080  — 0.008  0.186  
H4 
a1*a3*b2(via PN and JA) 0.050  — — — 
a1*a3 0.268  — 0.151  0.412  
a3*b2 0.071  — 0.008  0.156  
Note: PN = principle negotiation; JA = joint action; a1, a2, a3, b1, b2 respectively indicate 831 
the coefficients of each path, as shown in Fig. 2. 832 
